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Implied Private Rights of Action Under
Federal Law
Marc .Steinberg*
I. Introduction
In Touche Ross & Co. P. Redington, I the Supreme Court held that a private
right of action could not be implied under section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 Although the Court's decision certainly has significance
for those litigants who sought to invoke that provision, the ultimate impact of
the holding reaches far beyond the confines of section 17(a). Analysis of the
opinion reveals that the Redington Court has markedly altered the four-prong
whether a private cause of action should be
test of Cort v. Ash3 in determining
4
implied under a federal statute.
The Court's decision in Redington, however, cannot be viewed in isolation.
A short time prior to that holding, in Cannon v. University of Chicago,5 the Court
implied a private cause of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972.6 In so ruling, however, the Court's opinion was colored by one concurring opinion and two dissenting opinions which foreshadowed the coming of
7
Redington.
The purpose of this article is to assess the implication of private ,rights of
action under federal law. First, for background purposes, Cort and its progeny
will be discussed. The article will then examine the Court's decisions in Cannon
and Redington. In conclusion, the article will suggest how the federal courts
should confront the issue of the implication of private rights of action.
* Attorney, Securities and Exchange Commission (Division of Enforcement). Adjunct Professor,
Georgetown University Law Center. A.B., University of Michigan; J.D., University of California, Los
Angeles; LL.M., Yale University. Member, California and District of Columbia Bars.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any
private publication by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's colleagues upon the staff of the Commission.

1 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979).
2 15 U.S.C. 5 78q(a) (1976); 99 S. Ct. at 2485. In general terms, § 17(a) requires brokers-dealers and
other persons to maintain such records and file such reports "as the Commission, by rule, prescribes as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)(1)
(1976). The Redington decision, particularly when viewed in conjunction with the Court's decision in United
States v. Naftalin, 99 S. Ct. 2077 (1979), may have significant impact on the future judicial interpretation of
517(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 9 77q(a) (1976). That section, which is similar in language to
rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979), forbids fraudulent or deceptive conduct or the making of material
misstatements or nondisclosures in an offer or sale of securities. See Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the SecuritiesAct
of 1933 After Naftalin and Redington, 68 GEo. LJ. 163 (1979).
3 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
4 Id. at 78.
5 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979).
6 20 U.S.C. 55 1681-1686 (1976). The pertinent provision in Cannon was S 901(a) which, in relevant
part, provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... " Id. S 1681(a).

7 The concurring opinion was authored by justice Rehnquist who was joined by justice Stewart, and
the dissenting opinions were written by justice White with whom Justice Blackmun joined and by Justice
Powell. These opinions are discussed later in the article. See notes 43-61 infra and accompanying text.
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II. The Four-Prong Cort Test and Its Progeny
Until the Supreme Court's decision in Redington, both courts and commentators applied the four-prong test of Cort v,Ash8 as the appropriate standard by which to determine whether a private cause of action should be implied
under a federal statute. 9 Cort involved the question of whether a private
damage remedy was to be implied in favor of a stockholder against corporate
directors under section 610 of the Federal Election Campaign Act. 10 Answering
this question in the negative, the Court declared four broad principles that
should be employed when determining whether a private cause of action for
damages is implicit in a statute not expressly providing such an action. As
phrased by the Court, these principles are:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted,' '-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state
law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?"
Within these four broad principles, the Court recognized other facts which
courts should consider. First, in those situations where a private remedy is to
be implied, there should exist, in favor of the plaintiff, a clearly articulated
federal right,12 or, in the alternative, a pervasive legislative framework which
governs the interaction between the plaintiff and defendant classes in a particular regard.1 3 Second, where federal law clearly provides the plaintiff with
certain rights, proof of congressional intent to create a private remedy is not
necessary although an express congressional intent to deny such a remedy
would be controlling. 14 And third, in regard to causes of action sought to be inferred under federal corporate law, the Court asserted: "Corporations are
8 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
9 E.g., Local 714, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 589 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1978); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 568 F.2d
478 (6th Cir. 1977); Nedd v. UMW, 556 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978);
Dropkin, Implied Civil Liability Under the Trust Indenture Act: Trends and Prospects, 52 TUL. L. REv. 299 (1978);
Note, Implication of Private Actionsfrom Federal Statutes: From Borak to Ash, 1 J. CORP. LAW 371 (1976); Note,
Redington v. Touche Ross & Co.: An UnwarrantedImplication of a Private Right of Action Against Accountants
Under Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 1119 (1979); Note, Implied Private
Actions Under Federal Statutes - The Emergence of a Conservative Doctrine, 18 WM.& MARY L. REv. 429 (1976);
Comment, Implication of a Private Right of Action Under Title IX of the EducationAmendments of 1972, 73 Nw.
U.L. REv. 772 (1978); Comment, PrivateRights ofAction Under Amtrak andAsh: Some ImplicationsforImplication, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392 (1975).

10 Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch. 645, 5 610, 62 Stat. 723, as amended by Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 10,
63 Stat. 90; Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 20(c), 65 Stat. 718; Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 5
205, 86 Stat. 10 (amended 1974) (repealed 1976). 422 U.S. at 68.
11 422 U.S. at 78 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
12 Id. at 82 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
13 422 U.S. at 82 (citingJ.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)).
14 422 U.S. at 82. For a somewhat analogous principle to that stated in Cort, see National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. National Assoc. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974), where the Court noted:
A frequently stated principle of statutory construction is that when legislation expressly provides a
particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume
other remedies .... Since the [Amtrak] Act creates a public cause of action for the enforcement of
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creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors
on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain
responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern
the internal affairs of the corporation. "15
This last principle was applied by the Court in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green. 16 In Santa Fe, the Court held that section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 193417 and rule 10b-51 8 promulgated thereunder were not violated by
management's alleged breach of its fiduciary obligations to the corporation's
minority stockholders unless misrepresentation or lack of disclosure could be
proven.' 9 As a basis for its holding, the Santa Fe Court, citing Cort, concluded
that "[a]bsent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to
federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with
transactions in securities, particularly where established state policies of cor' 20
porate regulation would be overridden."
An application of the four-prong Cort test is evident in the Court's decision
in Piper v. Chris-CraftIndustries, Inc., 21 where it held that a defeated tender offeror has no implied cause of action for damages under section 14(e) of the
Williams Act. 2 2 The Court's analysis began with an examination of the
statutory language.2 3 After finding the statute to be silent on the question, the
Court noted that a private remedy may be implied on behalf of the particular
class designed to be protected by the statute if such a result is necessary to effectuate the congressional purposes underlying the statute.2 4 Subsequently, the
Court turned to the four-prong Cort test. Observing that because the intended
its provisions and a private cause of action only under very limited circumstances, this maxim
would clearly compel the conclusion that the remedies created in 9 307(a) are the exclusive means
to enforce the duties and obligations imposed by the Act. But even the most basic general
principles of statutory construction must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent. Accordingly,we turn to the legislative history of § 307(a).
Id. at 458 (citations omitted). Upon examining the legislative history, the Court concluded that § 307(a) of
the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (Amtrak Act), 45 U.S.C. S 547(a) (1976), by its terms, provided the
exclusive remedies for violations of the Act, thereby precluding the implication of additional private causes
of action to enforce compliance with the Act. 414 U.S. at 458-65.
15 422 U.S. at 84.
16 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
17 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b) (1976).
18 17 C.F.R. 5 240.10b-5 (1979).
19 "[T]he cases do not support the proposition . . . that a breach of fiduciary duty by majority
shareholders, without any deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure, violates the statute and the
Rule." 430 U.S. at 476.
20 Id. at 479. See Burks v. Lasker, 99 S.Ct. 561 (1979). Subsequently, a number of courts have applied
the Santa Fe principles to 5 14(e) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976), on the premise that the
language of that section (which in part prohibits any material misrepresentation or nondisclosure in connection with a tender offer) is patterned after rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Berman v. Gerber Prod. Co., 454 F. Supp.
1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Halle & Stieglitz, Filor, Bullard, Inc. v. Empress Int'l, Ltd., 442 F. Supp. 217
(D. Del. 1977); Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). This is so even if the target corporation's defensive tactics preclude or impede the shareholders from considering the bidder's offer. What these
courts are neglecting to consider is that the Williams Act was intended to protect the shareholder's right to
make the investment decision. As such, any defensive tactic that precludes or materially impedes a
shareholder from having the opportunity to decide whether to tender his stock violates the Act. See Great W.
United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276 (5th Cir. 1978), reversed on othergrounds, 47 U.S.L.W. 4844
(1979); Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy ofDefensive Tactics in Tender Offers 64 CORNELL L. REv. 901 (1979).
21 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
22 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976); 430 U.S. at 42.
23 430 U.S. at 24. Accord, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. at 1953; International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S. Ct. 790, 795 (1979); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 472; Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
24 430 U.S. at 25-26.
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beneficiaries of the Williams Act were the target corporation's shareholders,
Chris-Craft, as a tender offeror, was not "one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted.' '25 Second, the legislative history, as read by
the Court, evinced an intent to police the unregulated conduct of tender offerors. To provide such parties with a private damage remedy without any accompanying benefits in implying such a remedy to the protected shareholder

class would be incongruous with Congress' intent.2 6 Third, implying a private
cause of action in favor of offerors would be inconsistent with the legislative
scheme. As stated by the Court, "[a]s a disclosure mechanism aimed especially
at protecting shareholders of target corporations, the Williams Act cannot consistently be interpreted as conferring a monetary remedy upon regulated parties, particularly where the award would not redound to the direct benefit of the
protected class." 27 And, in reference to the last element of the Cort analysis,
relegating a tender offeror, at least where it seeks monetary damages, to
whatever remedies that exist under state law, is entirely appropriate in light of
the legislative framework created by Congress. 28 Accordingly, by invoking the
four-prong Cort test, the Court concluded that a tender offeror does not have an
implied cause of action for damages under section 14(e).
After Piper, the Court had other occasions to reevaluate the analysis by
which a private right of action should be implied under a federal statute.2 9 It
was not until Cannon v. University of Chicago,30 however, that the Court

25 Id. at 37 (quoting 422 U.S. at 78 (emphasis in original)). The Court paid particular attention to the
legislative history which overwhelmingly indicated that investor protection was the fundamental objective of
the Act. See 430 U.S. at 26-35.
26 430 U.S. at 38. Note the following comment by Professor Hayes who testified at the Senate hearings
on the bill:
The two major protagonists-the bidder and the defending management-do not need any additional protection, in our opinion. They have the resources and the arsenal of moves and
countermoves which can adequately protect their interests. Rather, the investor-who is the subject of these entreaties of both major protagonists-is the one who needs a more effective
champion ....
Id. at 29 (quoting ProposedAmendments to the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934: Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm.
on Securitiesof the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1967) (statement of Professor
Hayes)).
27 430 U.S. at 39. In holding that a tender offeror does not have an implied damage remedy under 5
14(e), the Court arguably inferred that such an offeror may have an implied right to sue for injunctive relief:
"In short, we conclude that shareholder protection, if enhanced at all by damage awards such as ChrisCraft contends for, can more directly be achieved with other, less drastic means more closely tailored to the
precise congressional goal underlying the Williams Act." Id. at 40. A number of lower courts have granted a
tender offeror an implied right of action for injunctive relief under 9 14(e). See, e.g., Humana, Inc. v.
American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,298, at 92,871
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1152
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
28 430 U.S. at 41. See Pitt, Standing to Sue under Williams Act after Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship on Troubled
Waters, 34 Bus. LAW. 117 (1978). See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975),
which was decided prior to Cort. In that case, the Court held that customers of financially failing brokersdealers did not have an implied cause of action under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA),
15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1976), to compel the Securities Investor Protection Corp. (SIPC) to act for their
benefit, thereby leaving the SEC, with its plenary authority, the exclusive party to compel the SIPC to
discharge its statutory obligations. In so holding, while noting that investor protection was the primary purpose underlying Congress' enactment of the SIPA, the Court stated: "It does not follow, however, that an
implied right of action by investors who deem themselves to be in need of the Act's protection, is either
necessary to or indeed capable of furthering that purpose." Id. at 421.
29 See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978).
30 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979).
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thoroughly analyzed the Cort test. The Cannon opinion disclosed that at least
some members were dissatisfied with the Cort standard.
III. Cannon v. University of Chicago
In Cannon, the Court implied a private cause of action under Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972.31 Title IX prohibits discrimination based
on sex under any education program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance. The Court held that Title IX impliedly granted the plaintiff a right
of action against the defendant universities which allegedly had denied her admission to their medical schools because of her sex. 32 In its holding, the Court
indicated that, in cases involving the implication of a private cause of action
under a federal statute, the Cort test remained viable: "[a] court must carefully
analyze the four factors that Cort identifies as indicative of such an intent."3
In applying this four-prong test to the case before it, the Cannon Court
declared that each of the factors had been satisfied, hence disposing of the need
to "weigh" the various factors.3 4 The Court's decision, moreover, recognized
other principles, namely, that an implied remedy may be inferred even where
the legislative history is silent or ambiguous on the question, 35 that when the
remedy is necessary or at least beneficial to the accomplishment of the statutory
objective, the Court is "decidedly receptive" to implying such a remedy3 6 and
that, even though other provisions of a complex legislative framework may
create express remedies, that fact is not "sufficient reason for refusing to imply
an otherwise appropriate remedy under a separate section. "3
The Court's support for the implication of private remedies under the Cort
test, however, was tempered by language contained in the opinion's last section. There, the Court stated that the far better course is for Congress to create
an express cause of action when it desires to afford private litigants redress to
support their statutory rights. However, "under certain limited cir31 20 U.S.C. 5§ 1681-1686 (1976).
32 99 S. Ct. at 1968. The defendant private universities were the University of Chicago and
Northwestern University.
33 Id. at 1953. The Court implied that although these four factors may be indicative of a congressional
intent to infer a private remedy, they are not conclusive. In certain cases, they may be overborne by
countervailing aiguments.
34 Id. at 1964. The question whether each of the four factors is to be weighed equally was definitively
answered in the negative by the Redington Court. See 99 S. Ct. at 2489; notes 69-70 infra and accompanying
text.
35 Relying on Cori, the Cannon Court noted "that the legislative history of a statute that does not expressly create or deny a private remedy will typically be equally silent or ambiguous on the question." 99 S.
Ct. at 1956 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 82).
36 99 S. Ct. at 1961. In various decisions, the Court has waivered on the question whether implication
must be "necessary" to the accomplishment of the legislative objective or merely "consistent" with or
"beneficial" to that objective. Compare Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. at 2486 ("necessary");
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. at 1713 ("necessary"); with Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct.
at 1961 ("necessary or at least helpful"); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 79 (White, J., dissenting) ("consistent with"); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 39 ("consistent with"); Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. at 78 ("consistent with"). This issue is discussed later in the article. See notes 100-107 infra
and accompanying text.
37 99 S. Ct. at 1965. The Court apparently limited this principle in Redington. See 99 S. Ct. at 2490; note
77 infira and accompanying text. For support of this principle, the Cannon Court citedJ.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964), where a private damage remedy was implied under S 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78n(a) (1976), even though that Act contains a number of express remedies. See,
e.g., 55 9(a), 16(b), 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §5 78i(a), 78p(b), 78r(a) (1976).
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cumstances," such failure by Congress is not inconsistent with its intent to
have the court imply an appropriate private remedy.3 8 Since the issue before
the Court presented "the atypical situation in which all of the [Cort] circumstances that the Court has previously identified as supportive of an implied
remedy are present," the majority
concluded that an implied cause of action
9
could properly be inferred.
The Court's limiting language in Cannon may suggest that the four-prong
Cort test is not, in fact, a balancing test; rather, all four elements of the Cort
analysis must be present to imply a private cause of action. 40 On the other
hand, the Court's restrictive language contained in an otherwise far-reaching
decision may have been added at the insistence of justices Stewart and Rehnquist who, while joining the Court's opinion, concurred in a separate opinion.
Without these Justices joining the Court's opinion, the Cannon Court would
have had no majority opinion. 4 1 Hence, the adding of the restrictive language
may have been necessary to induce Justices Stewart and Rehnquist to concur
42
in what otherwise would have been a plurality opinion.
The concurring opinion, authored by Justice Rehnquist and joined by
Justice Stewart, emphasized that the question of determining whether to imply
43
a private cause of action is fundamentally one of statutory construction.
Noting that the recent cases, such as Cort, approach the implication of private
remedy issue more stringently than the Court previously did, 44 Justice Rehn4 5
quist apprised Congress "that the ball, so to speak, may now be in its court."
From now on, he reasoned, the Court should be extremely reluctant to imply
private remedies without sufficient specificity by Congress. 46
The two dissenting opinions in Cannon are also significant. The first dis38 99 S. Ct. at 1967-68.
39 Id. at 1968 (emphasis in original).
40 See notes 110-13 infra and accompanying text.
41 Chief Justice Burger concurred in the Court's judgment but not in its opinion. Justices White,
Blackmun, and Powell dissented. Hence, if Justices Stewart and Rehnquist had not joined in the Court's
opinion, the plurality would have been composed of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.
42 But see 99 S. Ct. at 1981 n.14 (Powell, J., dissenting), where Justice Powell surmises that Justice
Rehnquist may have concurred in the Court's opinion because he perhaps considered himself temporarily
bound by his concurrence injustice Stevens' separate opinion in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 408-21 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). In Bakke, Justice Stevens addressing the
implication of remedy issue under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §S 2000d
to 2000d-6 (1976), which Title IX was patterned after, stated that "[tlhe conclusion that an individual may
maintain a private cause of action is amply supported in the legislative history of Title VI itself." 438 U.S.
at 420.
43 99 S. Ct. at 1968 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S.
Ct. at 795; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
44 Justice Rehnquist referred expressly toJ.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), where the Court
implied a cause of action under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976), in
order to effectuate the congressional purpose underlying the statute. Quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
(1946), the Borak Court stated:
It is for the federal courts "to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief" where
federally secured rights are invaded. "And it is also well settled that where legal rights have been
invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts
may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done."
377 U.S. at 433 (quoting 327 U.S. at 684).
45 99 S. Ct. at 1968 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
46 Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist, therefore, was notifying Congress that, in his
view, the Court, absent specific direction from the legislative branch, should be disinclined to imply private
rights of action in the future. His view is somewhat akin to that ofJustice Powell's. See notes 53-59 infra and
accompanying text. It also suffers from the same deficiencies. See notes 60-61, 114-19 infra and accompanying text.
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sent, written by Justice White and joined by Justice Blackmun, declares that
the controlling issue in determining whether to imply a private cause of action
is the congressional intent as shown by the legislative history and the statutory
scheme. As such, Justice White's dissent implicitly suggests that the Cort factors are merely guideposts for answering the ultimate question, namely,
whether Congress intended to create a private remedy.4 7 Applying this principle to the pending case, Justice White concluded that Congress did not intend
not under
to provide a private cause of action for discrimination perpetrated,
48
color of state law, but rather by private persons and institutions.
Justice White's dissent, however, should not be viewed as disfavoring
judicial implication of private rights of action. Simply, under the particular
statute construed in Cannon, he reasoned that Congress did not intend to create
a private remedy. Indeed, as the lone dissenter in Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez,49 Justice White concluded, after ascertaining the legislative intent
and applying the Cort four-prong test, that the Indian Civil Rights Act of 196850
impliedly authorized a private cause of action for enforcing its provisions. 51 He
contended that such a private remedy was necessary to effectuate52Congress' intent. Otherwise, the statute may be rendered a virtual nullity.
47 99 S. Ct. at 1968 (White, J., dissenting). It is significant to note, however, that Cort was among the
three cases cited by Justice White for the proposition that prior decisions of the Court make clear that congressional intent is the controlling issue in determining whether to imply a private cause of action. The other
cases cited were Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. National Assoc. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974). See 99 S. Ct. at 1968 n.1
(White, J., dissenting).
48 Responding to the Court's implication of a private remedy under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976), Justice White argued:
Congress decided in Title IX, as it had in Title VI, to prohibit certain forms of discrimination
by recipients of federal funds. Where those recipients were acting under color of state law, individuals could obtain redress in the federal courts for violation of these prohibitions. But, excepting
post-Civil War enactments dealing with racial discrimination in specified situations, these forms
of discrimination by private entities had not previously been subject to individual redress under
federal law, and Congress decided to reach such discrimination not by creating a new remedy for
individuals, but by relying on the authority of the Federal Government to enforce the terms under
which federal assistance would be provided. Whatever may be the wisdom of this approach to the
problem of private discrimination, it was Congress' choice, not to be overridden by this Court.
99 S. Ct. at 1974 (White, J., dissenting).
49 436 U.S. 49 (1978). The issue presented in that case involved whether an implied cause of action for
declaratory and injunctive relief existed under Title I of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. 25 U.S.C. 5
1301-1303 (1976). Section 102(8) of the Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1976), provides in relevant part that
"[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws .... " The Act's only express remedial provision grants any person detained by order of an Indian tribe the writ of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of his confinement in a
federal court. 25 U.S.C. 5 1303 (1976). While noting that a central purpose of the Act was to protect individual Indians from capricious actions by tribal governments, the Court was unpersuaded that ajudicially
sanctioned intervention into tribal sovereignty was required to effectuate the Act's objectives. Rather, the
Act's legislative history, as read by the Court, suggests "that Congress' failure to provide remedies other
than habeas corpus was a deliberate one." 436 U.S. at 61.
50 25 U.S.C. §5 1301-1303 (1976).
51 436 U.S. at 72-83 (White, J., dissenting). Note particularly the following: "Given Congress' concern about the deprivations of Indian rights by tribal authorities, I cannot believe, as does the majority, that
it desired the enforcement of these rights to be left up to the very tribal authorities alleged to have violated
them." Id. at 82.
52 Id. at 79-83 (White, J., dissenting). Responding to the Court's assertion that the implication of a
private remedy would interfere with tribal sovereignty, Justice White responded:
The extension of constitutional rights to individual citizens is intended to intrude upon the authority
of government. And once it has been decided that an individual does possess certain rights vis-avis his government, it necessarily follows that he has some way to enforce those rights. Although
creating a federal cause of action may "constitutfe] an interference with tribal autonomy and selfgovernment beyond that created by the change in substantive law itself," in my mind, it is a
further step that must be taken; otherwise, the change in the law may be meaningless.
Id. at 83 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted) (quoting 436 U.S. at 59).
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The second dissenting opinion in Cannon, written by Justice Powell, takes
an extreme position. In his view, the four-prong Cort test must be abandoned
not only for policy reasons but because Cort's mode of analysis does not comport with the doctrine of the separation of powers. As stated by Justice Powell,
"[T]he 'four factor' analysis of that case is an open invitation to federal courts
to legislate causes of action not authorized by Congress. It is an analysis not
faithful to constitutional principles and should be rejected. .... ,,53
Of the four factors enumerated in Cort, only the second factor, according
to Justice Powell, expressly relates to Congress' intent. The other three prongs
invite independent judicial lawmaking.5 4 As "conclusive" support for this
assertion, he points out that although the Supreme Court has consistently
rebuked attempts to create private actions,5 5 there has been a "flood of lower
court decisions" since Cort which have implied private remedies from federal
statutes.5 6 These decisions demonstrate, Justice Powell argues, that "Cort
allows the Judicial Branch to assume policymaking authority vested by the
Constitution in the Legislative Branch." '57 It also permits Congress to avoid
the difficult task of resolving the often controversial issue of whether a private
58
cause of action should accompany the enactment of a regulatory statute.
Because Cort fails to solve, and in fact perpetuates, these problems, it must be
abandoned. Henceforth, Justice Powell concludes that the Court should imply
a private cause of action from a federal statute only where there exists the most
59
compelling evidence of affirmative legislative intent.
Although there may well exist strong policy reasons why Congress rather
than the federal judiciary should be the proper branch to authorize private actions, Justice Powell's assertion that the courts are pursuing an unconstitutional course is premised on unduly strict notions of judicial restraint. The extreme position taken by Justice Powell is amplified by the observation that the
53 99 S. Ct. at 1975 (Powell, J., dissenting). From a policy standpoint, Justice Powell argued that the
determination of whether to provide a private damage remedy under Title IX "should have been resolved
by the elected representatives in Congress after public hearings, debate, and legislative decision. It is not a
question properly to be decided by relatively uninformed federal judges who are isolated from the political
process." Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
54 Id. at 1980 (Powell, J., dissenting).
55 Id. (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49 (1978); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
56 99 S. Ct. at 1980 (Powell, J., dissenting). In total, Justice Powell cites twenty such federal appellate
decisions. See, e.g., Local 714, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 589 F.2d I
(1st Cir. 1978) (S 13(c) of Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964); Lodge 1858, American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. Webb, 580 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 927 (1978) (§ 203 of National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958); Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1016 (1979) (Art. 28(1) of Warsaw Convention of 1929); Association of Data Processing
Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 568 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1977) (§ 11(e) of Federal
Home Loan Bank Act).
57 99 S. Ct. at 1981 (Powell, J., dissenting). Referring to these appellate decisions, Justice Powell contends that "[i]t defies reason to believe that in each of these statutes Congress absentmindedly forgot to
mention an intended private action." Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 1985 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell is particularly hostile to implying a private remedy
when the statute in question expressly provides an alternative mechanism for enforcing its provisions. In
that regard, Justice Powell voiced his displeasure with the Court's holding inJ.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964). In Borak, the Court implied a private remedy under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976), even though the statute provides an administrative mechanism for enforcement.
Referring to Borak, Justice Powell viewed the decision as "both unprecedented and incomprehensible as a
matter of public policy." 99 S. Ct. at 1977. It is interesting to note, however, that despite the presence of
strict constructionist Justices, such as Justices Harlan and Stewart, the Borak decision was unanimous.
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twenty federal appellate decisions he cites as unconstitutionally implying
private rights of action are not products of the liberal Warren Court era.
Rather, a substantial number of judges who decided these cases were appointed by Presidents Nixon and Ford. To argue that these strict constructionist judges, as many of them undoubtedly may fairly be categorized, are
engaging in judicial legislation is an overstatement. 60 In essence, Justice
Powell's opinion suggests that he may be unfamiliar with the legislative process. He wants Congress to speak loudly and clearly whenever it seeks to effectuate a legislative objective. Although the implementation of this practice
would be desirable, it is unrealistic. Legislation is often ambiguous, not
because ambiguity is desirable, but because compromise, with the attendant
loss of clarity, is required for passage of the legislation. Such a result may be
unfortunate, but at least frequently in our system, it is the nature of the
61
legislative process .
The Court's decision in Cannon, with its accompanying concurrence and
dissents, constituted the first step in modifying the four-prong Cort test. The
second, and perhaps final, step was completed62 when the Court handed down
its decision in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington.
IV. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington
In Redington, the Court held that a private cause of action could not be implied under section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.63 That section
requires brokers-dealers and others to keep such records and file such reports
as the Commission "may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.' '64 The facts in Redington involved the
filing of a lawsuit against Touche Ross by the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation and the trustee in liquidation of Weis Securities. The suit alleged,
inter alia, that in auditing and certifying Weis' financial statements, in preparing the firm's answers to New York Stock Exchange financial questionnaires,
and in issuing opinion letters for Weis, Touche Ross' dereliction prevented the
disclosure of Weis' true financial condition until it was too late to take action to
60 See, e.g., Local 714, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 589 F.2d 1 (1st
Cir. 1978) (5 13(c) of Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964) (Coffin, J. (Johnson); Campbell, J. (Nixon);
Bownes, J. (Ford)); AFGE v. Webb, 580 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 927 (1978) (5 203 of
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958) (Clark, Justice (Truman); MacKinnon, J. (Nixon); Robb, J.
(Nixon)); Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., 575 F.2d 237 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,439 U.S. 952 (1978), scheduled
for reargument, 99 S. Ct. 2048 (1979) (5 206 of Investment Advisers Act of 1940) (Browning, J. (Kennedy);
Wallace, J. (Nixon); East, D.j. (Eisenhower)); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978) (5 206 of Investment Advisers Act of 1940) (Mansfield, J. (Nixon); Timbers, J.
(Nixon); Gurfein, J., dissenting (Ford)); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Federal
Home Loan Bank Bd., 568 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1977) (5 11(e) of Federal Home Loan Bank Board Act)
(Weick, J. (Eisenhower); Celebrezze, J. (Johnson); Engel, J. (Nixon)).
61 As stated by Chief Justice Traynor:
Legislators are under no compulsion to disclose the reasons for a rule, let alone to keep a chronicle
of its origins. Sometimes a statute is enveloped in a history so voluminous or ambiguous as to be
more confusing than revealing. A statute may be dubious because those who sponsored it were not
motivated to do so in the public interest or because those who enacted it did so without adequate
knowledge or consideration of its objectives or implications....
Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L. REv. 401, 424 (1968).
62 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979).
63 15 U.S.C. 5 78q(a) (1976).
64 Id.
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forestall liquidation or to lessen the adverse financial impact of bankruptcy on
65
the firm's customers.
In seeking monetary damages against Touche Ross, the plaintiffs were
unable to invoke the express remedy provided by section 18(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act. 66 Section 18(a) imposes liability upon persons who make
material misleading statements in reports or other documents filed with the
Commission. Use of the section is limited, however, to those persons who, relying on the misrepresentation, "shall have purchased or sold a security at a
price which was affected by such statements." 67 In Redington, however, Weis'
customers were neither purchasers nor sellers. Rather, the claim asserted on
the customers' behalf by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation and the
trustee in liquidation was that they did not receive the remedial assistance they
otherwise would have if Touche Ross had not been derelict in its examinations
of Weis' section 17 (a) reports. 68 Hence, the plaintiffs were left with no alternative federal private recourse than to seek monetary relief pursuant to section
17(a).
Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist emphasized that its task in
deciding whether to imply a private right of action in the instant case was
limited "solely" to a determination of Congress' intent. 69 In its holding, the
Court rejected the notion that each of the four Cort principles is to be weighed
equally. Rather, if the statute at issue does not provide private rights to any
identifiable class, does not prohibit any conduct as unlawful, and its legislative
history is silent or ambiguous on the existence of private remedies, then Congress' intent, either expressly or by implication, to create a private remedy has
been conclusively answered in the negative. In such a case, a court is obligated
not to consider the third and fourth factors of the Cort test, namely, whether the
implication of a private remedy is necessary to effectuate the statute's purpose
70
and whether the action is one traditionally relegated to state law.
In essence, the Redington Court expanded the first two steps of the Cort test
into a three-prong analysis. The other two steps of the Cort test become ap-

65 99 S. Ct. at 2484. Redington involved only the second case in which an implied damage remedy was
inferred under 5 17(a). See Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104, 124 (W.D. Ark.
1949). In an accompanying footnote, the Court implied that the absence of prior recognition of implying a
private remedy under § 17(a) may have created a negative inference. 99 S. Ct. at 2490 n. 19.
66 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
67 Id.
68 99 S. Ct. at 2484.
69 Id. at 2485. In another portion of the opinionJustice Rehnquist stated that "[tihe central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action."
Id. at 2489 (emphasis added). Query whether the distinction between the "central" as opposed to the
"sole" purpose permits the Court to consider policy factors in its analysis.
70 Id. at 2489. See Steinberg, supra note 2. The question of whether all factors of the modified Cort test
must be met is still unresolved. See notes 110-13 infra and accompanying text.
It is interesting to note that while Justice Brennan joined in the majority's opinion, his concurrence
suggests that the Court has not, in fact, modified Cort. Justice Brennan stated that
when, as here, a statute clearly does not "create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff," when
the plaintiff is not "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted," and when
there is also in the legislative history no "indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit ... to
create such a remedy," the remaining two Cort factors cannot by themselves be a basis for
implying a right of action.
99 S. Ct. at 2491 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Justice Brennan's
analysis, although perhaps a proper application of Cort, ignores the fact that the Court modified the Cort
four-prong test.
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plicable only if one of the new three prongs is satisfied. At the same time,
however, prior case law mandates that even where the statute confers private
rights in certain individuals or proscribes certain conduct as illegal, a clear congressional intent to preclude a private cause of action must be deemed controlling. 71 As a practical matter, then, Redington's modification of Cort comes into
play when the legislative intent on implying a private remedy under a given
statute is silent or ambiguous. Such a situation necessitates a consideration of
whether the statute creates federal rights in favor of certain persons or prohibits
certain conduct. Only if one of these two questions is answered in the affir72
mative do the third and fourth factors of Cort become relevant.
A similar suggestion is that Redington modifies only the first step of the Cort
test and makes that step an almost essential condition for implying a private
right of action. No longer should courts faced with the implication issue consider whether the plaintiff was "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted." ' 73 Rather, courts should assess whether the statute
creates a private right on behalf of the plaintiff or proscribes certain conduct as
illegal. 74 Unless one of these two factors is met in a case in which the legislative
history is silent or ambiguous, there can be no implication of a private cause of
action.
The Redington Court enunciated other principles to aid in ascertaining
Congress' intent in the implication of private remedy dilemma when the
legislative history is silent or ambiguous. First, the fact that a statute's primary
focus is to prevent or forestall future harm rather than to provide recompense
after a violation has occurred militates against implication. 75 Second, when a
statute is surrounded by other sections of the same Act which expressly provide
private remedies, the inference arises that "when Congress wished to provide a
private damage remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly." ' 76 This
71 See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. at 1956; Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 82. Somewhat
related to this principle is that "the fact that a federal statute has been violated and some person harmed
does not automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of that person." 99 S. Ct. at 1953. See
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); note 28 supra. Also, although a
criminal statute does not necessarily preclude implication of a private damage remedy, such a statute apparently must have available some type of civil enforcement, such as declaratory, injunctive, or other form
of civil relief. 422 U.S. at 79-80. See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201-02 (1967);
notes 94-95 infra and accompanying text.
72 If the legislative history of a statute clearly evidences that Congress desired the courts to imply a
private remedy, query whether the other factors of the modified Cori test are relevant. The answer should be
that such an expression of congressional intent should be deemed controlling. The failure of Congress to expressly provide a remedy in such a situation may be due to its inclination to provide the courts with adequate flexibility to equitably administer the statute on an ad hoc basis. See notes 84-92 infra and accompanying text.
73 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78 (emphasis in original), quoting Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S.
33, 39 (1916). As noted earlier, Justice Brennan evidently believes that this Cort factor remains applicable.
Set note 70 supra. However, the Redington Court ignores this factor and substitutes for it the inquiry whether
the statute creates a federal right in some person, or in lieu thereof, proscribes certain conduct as unlawful.
74 Regardless of whether Redington may be viewed as modifying one or two steps of the Cort test, the
focus of the altered test is not whether the plaintiff is within the especial class to be protected by the statute
but whether the statute confers rights in the plaintiff or legally proscribes the defendant's actions vis-a-vis
the plaintiff.
75 99 S. Ct. at 2486. In the case of S 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, the Court held that, by its
terms, it "is forward-looking, not retrospective; it seeks to forestall insolvency, not to provide recompense
after it has occurred." Id.
76 Id. at 2487. Without deciding the issue, the Redington Court remarked that there is evidence to support the view that § 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act contains the exclusive remedy for misstatements
made in reports filed with the Commission, including those reports filed pursuant to 9 17(a). See note 67
supra and accompanying text; note 78 infra and accompanying text.
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principle appears inconsistent with the Court's holding in Cannon where it concluded "that other provisions of a complex statutory scheme create express
remedies has not been accepted as a sufficient reason for refusing to imply an
otherwise appropriate remedy under a separate section."" Finally, if the principal express civil remedy is directed at essentially the same type of misconduct
as the statute at issue and if the two provisions were passed contemporaneously
by Congress, the Court will be "extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action
in [the statute in question] that is significantly broader than the remedy that
78
Congress chose to provide."
There can be little doubt that the Court's decision in Redinglon is a limiting
one for implying private causes of action under federal law. The decision not
only significantly alters the Cort test, thereby making it more difficult to imply a
federal remedy, but also enunciates other restrictive principles under the implication doctrine. At the same time, however, Redington in no way mandates or
even suggests that federal causes of action should not be implied in the future
either because of constitutional or policy reasons. 79 In addition, certain restrictive propositions advanced by the Redington Court conflict with the more expansive principles enunciated in Cannon. 80 The end result is that the proper
analysis that courts should employ when determining whether to imply a
private cause of action under a federal statute is open to debate. The following
discussion proposes an approach that courts should adopt when confronted
with the implication of private remedy issue.
V. Implied Causes of Action Under Federal LawA Recommended Approach
As alluded to in the preceding discussion, although a restrictive decision,
Redington should not be viewed as a death knell to judicial implication of federal
causes of action. Rather, in light of that holding, courts should be aware that
the flexible four-prong Cort test has been substantially altered. In its stead is a
modified version of Cort which is more stringent but nevertheless receptive to
the implication of private remedies in appropriate circumstances.
The thrust of the modified test is directed at statutory construction for the
purpose of ascertaining Congress' intent. Policy reasons are relegated to secon-

77 99 S. Ct. at 1965. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
78 99 S. Ct. at 2488. Thus, because 5 18(a) created an express remedy in favor of only purchasers and
sellers, the Court was unwilling to expand this class of plaintiffs in actions attempted to be brought under 5
17(a). Dissenting, Justice Marshall argued that there is a divergence in focus between §§ 17(a) and 18(a).
While 5 18(a) concerns investors who are injured, by relying on misstated public filings, in securities
transactions, § 17(a), Justice Marshall points out, is concerned exclusively with brokerage firm customers
who may suffer financial loss by a broker's insolvency. 99 S. Ct. at 2491-92 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Applying the four-step Cort test, Justice Marshall concluded that a private damage remedy should be implied
under § 17(a). Id. at 2492. See Steinberg, supra note 2.
79 In this regard, Redington, unlike justice Powell's dissent in Cannon, nowhere implies that judicial implication of private rights of action is violative of constitutional principles or is undesirable from a public
policy perspective. Justice Powell did not participate in Redington.
80 See, e.g., notes 37, 76-77 supra and accompanying text.
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dary status, if they are to be considered at all. 81 Supposedly, such a rationale
82
furnished the underpinning for the Court's adoption of Cort's four factors.
However, the weighing process of these factors on an ad hoc basis, when considered along with the threshold question of whether the aggrieved plaintiffs
were the intended beneficiaries of the statutory scheme, allegedly induced
83
courts to consider factors other than those related to statutory interpretation.
The starting point of the modified Cort test, as in any case of statutory construction, is to examine "the language of the statute itself." 84 The concomitant
inquiry is that of ascertaining the statute's legislative history. This latter inquiry lies at the heart of the test. 85 If the legislative history indicates that Congress definitely considered and reached a conclusion on whether a private
86
remedy should be provided, the other aspects of the test become irrelevant.
Note, however, that although Congress usually provides an express remedy
when it desires to afford an injured party private redress, this may not always
be the case. In certain instances, Congress may intend to have the federal
judiciary devise appropriate private remedies to enable the courts to interpret

81 See note 69 supra and accompanying text. But see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723 (1975), where the Court weighed "considerations of policy"in holding that a nonpurchasing offeree
does not have a private cause of action for damages under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder. Id. at 749. The key policy rationale prompting the Court to reject nonpurchasing offeree standing was the fear of vexatious litigation. This concern was based on two grounds. First,
in securities litigation, a complaint, even if it has little possibility of success at trial, has a distinct settlement
value so long as the plaintiff can prevent the action from being dismissed at the summary judgment stage.
The reason for this leverage, according to the Court, is that the presence of a lawsuit may hamper the defendant's normal business activities. Id. at 740-43. Second, abolishing the purchaser standing requirement
would open the floodgates to the bringing of actions involving hazy issues of historical fact which could be
resolved by the trier of act only through oral testimony. Id. at 743. In such a situation, the plaintiff's
testimony could be based on uncorroborated oral evidence and yet be sufficient for his case to go to the jury:
The very real risk in permitting [a nonpurchasing offeree] to sue under Rule IOb-5 is that the door
will be open to recovery of substantial damages on the part of one who offers only his own
testimony to prove that he ever consulted a prospectus of the issuer, that he paid any attention to
it, or that the representations contained in it damaged him.
Id. at 746. On this basis, the Court concluded that the Birnbaum rule, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193
F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), which limits a private cause of action for damages under
S 10(b) and rule 10b-5 to purchasers and sellers of securities, should be affirmed. See Murdock, Birnbaum
Revitalized: New Life for Motions to Dismiss in lOb-5 Actions for Damages, 1975 UTAH L. RE'.'. 663.
In Blue Chip Stamps, the Court noted that one of the justifications for implying a private right of action
under 5 10(b) lies in § 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976), which provides that contracts made in violation of any provision of the Act are voidable at the election of the innocent
party. 421 U.S. at 735. Although rarely invoked since its enactment, the possible implications of § 29(b) are
massive. See Eastside Church of Christ v. National Plan, Inc., 391 F.2d 357 (5th Cir.) (Bell, J.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 913 (1968); Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Section 29(b) of the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934: A Viable
Remedy Awakened, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1979).
82 See 422 U.S. at 82-84.
83 See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. at 1980 (Powell, J., dissenting): "Of the four factors
mentioned in Cori only one refers expressly to legislative intent. The other three invite independent judicial
lawmaking."
Perhaps it should be noted that the Court has adopted an ad hoc balancing test on other occasions.
See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), where the Court identified four factors that courts should
weigh on a case-by-case basis to determine whether a defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a
speedy trial: "[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice
to the defendant." Id. at 530. See Godbold, Speedy Trial - Major Surgeryfor a National Ill, 24 ALA. L. REv.
265, 274-88 (1972), where Judge Godbold thoroughly analyzes these four factors.
84 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. at 2485. Accord, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S.
Ct. at 1953; Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 472; Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at
24; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197.
85 See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. at 2489; Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 82.
86 See note 85 supra.
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equitably the statute as the circumstances of the particular case and other relevant factors may require.8 7
It must be emphasized that a clear expression of legislative intent to provide or not to provide private cause of action is generally controlling. There
may be exceptions, however, to this broad principle. One exception is where
Congress desires the courts to imply a private remedy but such implication
would violate the Constitution. For instance, in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 88 the Court declared unconstitutional 1974 amendments to the Fair
Labor Standards Act which extended statutory minimum wage and maximum
hour requirements to the States and their political subdivisions.8 9 Had Congress intended that the federal courts imply a private remedy on behalf of
disgruntled employees against their employer-state governments, the courts
presumably would be constitutionally obligated not to effect Congress' intent.
To hold otherwise could well violate not only fundamental notions of
federalism but also the tenth and eleventh amendments. 90
Another possible exception arises when Congress had previously enacted a
statute in which it did not intend to provide a private damage remedy. This intent may have been due to a number of factors, for example, that injunctive
relief was deemed sufficient, that the damage remedy, for reasons of comity,
should be left to the States, or that the statutorily imposed workmen's compensation schedule, in the area of admiralty law, for instance, was adequate. 91
Through the passage of time, however, it becomes evident that Congress' rationale, although once supportable, no longer remains plausible. Rather than
87 As Justice Powell asserted in Cannon, such inaction by Congress may constitute an abdication of its
constitutional duties. See 99 S. Ct. at 1981 (Powell, J., dissenting). On the other hand, it may be argued that
such inaction is the inherent consequence of our political system. Rather than criticizing Congress for its
refusal to act, the judiciary should recognize that this abstention is a natural by-product of our legislative
process. See notes 114-19 infra and accompanying text.
88 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
89 As the basis for its holding, the Court stated that the statute affronted the tenth amendment to the
Constitution because it "operate[d] to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations
in areas of traditional governmental functions." Id. at 852. For commentary on NationalLeague of Cities, see
Beaird & Ellington, A Commerce PowerSeesaw: Balancing National League of Cities, 11 CA. L. REv. 35 (1976);
Lay, States' Rights: The Emergence of a New Judicial Perspective, 22 S.D.L. REv. 1 (1977); Percy, National
League of Cities v. Usery: The Tenth Amendment Is Alive and Doing Well, 51 TUL. L. REv. 95 (1976); Comment, The State Sovereignty Doctrine Since National League of Cities v. Usery: A New ConstitutionalInterpretation
Under the Commerce Clause, 81 DICK. L. REv. 599 (1977).
90 Clearly, an analysis based on the tenth amendment and the concept of constitutional federalism is inextricably intertwined. Although each serves to protect state sovereignty, they accomplish this objective
through different approaches: "The tenth amendment analysis concentrates on powers implicitly 'reserved'
to the states by the constitution; the federalism analysis, emphasizing relationships between specific constitutional provisions and the structure of the constitution itself, focuses on the autonomy possessed by the
states as governmental entities." Steinberg & Koneck, Federalism, the Tenth Amendment and the Legal Profession:
The Power of a FederalJudge to Restrain a Convicted Attorney, as a Condition of Probation,from Practicingin the State
Courts, 56 NEB. L. REv. 783, 793 n.42 (1977). CompareC. BLACK, PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 40
(1963), with Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguardsof Federalism: The Role of the States in the Compositionand Selection of
the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954).
91 See, e.g., the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251 (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). Prior to 1972, the Act had not
been amended since 1961, and before that in 1956, 1948, and 1927. In order to adequately protect the injured worker, significant increases in benefits were imperative. Impatient with Congress' inaction and
dissatisfied with the obsolete benefits of the compensation statute, the Court decided to provide
longshoremen with third-party actions against shipowners under the seaworthiness doctrine and to transfer
the ultimate liability for these damages to the party best able to bear the costs, the stevedore-employers. See
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346
U.S. 406 (1953); Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling and Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952); Seas
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
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legislating to correct the injustice, Congress unfortunately declines to act. Such
inaction may be traced to Congress' heavy legislative calendar, its lack of
knowledge that the deficiency exists, the lobbying efforts of special interest
groups, or its expectation that the judiciary will construe the statute so as to
alleviate the problem. In such a situation, a strong argument can be made that
the federal judiciary should imply a private damage remedy rather than to permit gross injustices to continue. Implication of a private right of action in this
situation arguably involves basic principles of human justice that warrant the
92
creation of a remedy that Congress has neglected to provide.
More often than not, however, when the implication of private remedy
issue arises, the applicable statute's legislative history will be silent or ambiguous. Under Redington, the critical inquiry is whether the statute, by its
terms, grants certain rights to the plaintiff or proscribes certain conduct as
unlawful. 93 Only if this inquiry is answered in the affirmative are the third and
fourth factors of the Cort test deemed relevant. Where, however, the statute in
question prohibits certain conduct and provides solely for a criminal penalty,
extraordinary circumstances must be present for a court to infer a private
remedy. 94 On the other hand, where a criminal statute also provides for some
form of civil relief, such as declaratory or95injunctive relief, the other two factors
of the Cori test become fully applicable.
Before proceeding to discuss the third and fourth factors of the Cort test in
light of Cannon and Redington, a further question exists: whether the availability
of express remedies in other provisions of the same Act should create a negative
inference for implying a private remedy in the statute at issue. Statements in
Cannon and Redington appear irreconcilable on this point. 96 Nevertheless, the
two decisions can be harmonized. As Redington implicitly recognizes, it is one
thing to create a negative inference for implication solely because other sections
of the Act contain express remedies and quite another when the express
remedies are directed at the same type of conduct, are intended to benefit the
same identifiable class, and are passed contemporaneously with the statute in
question.97 As to the former, no negative inference should be drawn. To do so
would create the presumption that the implication of private rights of action are
disfavored in all circumstances. Without clear guidance from Congress, such
an interpretation would be erroneous. There can be little question that in appropriate circumstances Congress is- aware of and is supportive of future
judicial implication of private remedies. To deny a private right of action in
this situation would not only undermine Congress' intent but would also inflict

92 See generally O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35 (1881): "The very considerations which judges
most rarely mention, and always with an apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices
of life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned."
93 99 S. Ct. at 2489. See notes 71-74 supra and accompanying text.
94 See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 79-80; note 71 supra.
95 422 U.S. at 79-80. Referring toJ.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), the Court noted that
private actions for declaratory relief were authorized and that the SEC could sue to enjoin violations of S
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78n(a) (1976). 422 U.S. at 79-80 n. 11. See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. at 201-02.
96 See notes 76-77 supra and accompanying text.
97 See 99 S. Ct. at 2488; note 78 supra and accompanying text.
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needless injustices upon aggrieved parties. 9 As to the latter, however, a
negative inference can properly be drawn. In this instance, Congress expressly
focused on the conduct in question and the class to be afforded recompense.
Before drawing such an inference, however, courts should assure themselves
that the focus of the statute providing the express remedy is directed at the
same type of conduct and is intended to benefit the same identifiable class as
the statute which the plaintiff seeks to invoke. If the answer to the foregoing is
in the affirmative, then for the courts to impliedly expand the scope of this express remedy may well represent judicial legislation in the face of clear congressional intent. 99
At first sight, it appears that Cannon and Redington left the third and fourth
elements of the Cort analysis untouched. More exacting scrutiny indicates,
however, that such is not the case. Indeed, the inconsistency between these two
decisions is amplified by their references to the third step of Cort. As stated in
Cort, the third factor considers whether it is "consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff." 100
As viewed by Justice White, dissenting in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, this
step is "[tihe most important consideration."1 0 1 In decisions subsequent to
Cort, however, the Court stated in Piper and Santa Fe that a private damage
remedy is to be implied only when it is "necessary to effectuate Congress'
goals." 1 0 2 In this regard, though, the Court was not referring to the third prong
of the Cort test in particular but rather, as a general proposition, to the feasibility of the implication doctrine. 10 3

98 See, e.g., 5 14(e) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976), which proscribes the making ofany
material misstatement or nondisclosure in connection with a tender offer. That statute does not expressly
provide for a private cause of action on behalf of injured investors. However, because S 14(e)'s language is
patterned after rule 1Ob-5 and because Congress was aware that the courts had implied a private right of action under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 in favor of purchasers and sellers, § 14(e) was adopted for the purpose of
protecting the target corporation's shareholders in situations where § 10(b) was inapplicable, i.e., in cases
where the target shareholders had been defrauded or subjected to material misrepresentations or nondisclosures during the course of a tender offer but had not purchased or sold stock. In this situation, it is apparent that, although Congress did not legislate on the subject, it anticipated that the courts would imply a
private remedy in favor of the target corporation's shareholders. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577
F.2d 1256, 1276-78 (5th Cir. 1978), reversed on othergrounds sub nom. LeRoy v. Great W. United Corp., 99 S.
Ct. 2710 (1979); Spielman v. General Host Corp., 402 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 39 (2d
Cir. 1976); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,419 U.S. 873 (1974); McCloskey v. Epko Shoes, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 1279 (E.D.P.A. 1975); Petersen v. Federated Dev. Co., 387 F.
Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); note 20 supra.
99 See generally TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978):
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by
the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an
enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, thejudicial process comes to an end.
We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of veto.
100 422 U.S. at 78.
101 436 U.S. at 79-80 (White, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Martinez and Justice White's dissenting
opinion in that case, see notes 49-52 supra and accompanying text.
102 Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 26. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 477
(quoting 430 U.S. at 41).
103 See note 102 supra. Thus, in Piper, after applying all four factors of Cort, the Court stated "judicially
creating a damages action in favor of Chris-Craft [as a tender offeror is unnecessary to ensure the fulfillment of Congress' purposes in adopting the Williams Act." 430 U.S. at 41. In Santa Fe, the Court, quoting
the above language in Piper, held that an alleged breach of corporate fiduciary duty does not give rise to a
private cause of action for damages under § 10(b). 430 U.S. at 477. Citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375, 381-85 (1970) (which involved the alleged use of defective proxy materials to procure
shareholder approval of a proposed merger), the Court stated that "once full and fair disclosure has occurred, the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the statute." 430 U.S.
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That the Court continued to adhere to the third prong of the Cort test was
evidenced by its decision in Cannon. In reference to that factor, the Cannon
Court stated that when a private "remedy is necessary or at least helpful to the
accomplishment of the statutory purpose, the Court is decidedly receptive to its
implication under the statute.' '104 The Court's possible departure from this
language occurred in Redington. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court and
referring specifically to the third prong, remarked that in view of the fact that
the plaintiffs failed to satisfy their initial burden under the modified Cort test,
the Court need not consider whether implication of a private remedy is
"necessary" to effectuate the section's purpose.10 5 Hence, the question arises
whether Cort's third factor has been modified from requiring that implication
be consistent with or helpful to the legislative objective to the far more onerous
requirement that it be necessary to effectuate the statute's purpose.
An overly strict construction of Cort's third factor can all but eliminate the
future implication of private remedies. Under this stringent approach, a court,
under practically any given set of circumstances, can plausibly conclude that
implication is unnecessary to effectuate the statute's objective. On the other
hand, an analysis premised on whether implication is "consistent" with the
legislative purpose encourages the courts to engage in a policy-oriented appraisal which Redington was intended to prevent.10 6 Perhaps, the better approach is for the judiciary to recognize that, regardless whether implication of a
private remedy is merely consistent with, rather than necessary to, the effectuation of a statute's purpose, the ultimate determination is one of congressional
intent. This inquiry, however, may raise more questions than it answers. No
doubt, in many circumstances, Congress' intent will be unknown. When this
occurs, the courts should attempt to abide by the strictures of Redington and not
partake in a policy analysis. At the same time, courts should not invoke such a
strict application of Cort's third prong so as to conclusively foreclose the im0 7
plication of private causes of action.1
Turning to Cort's fourth factor, which relates to whether the remedy
sought to be implied is one traditionally relegated to state law, neither Cannon
nor Redington explicitly cultivates new ground in this area. However, a primary
focus of Redington is directed at the relationship between the federal judiciary
and Congress. In this regard, private remedies should be judicially implied only after a determination that such implication effectuates Congress' intent in

at 478. On this basis, the Court declined to recognize a private right of action under § 10(b) where there has
been no deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure. To imply such a remedy for breach of corporate
fiduciary duty alone, according to the Court, would serve "at best a subsidiary purpose" of the Securities
Exchange Act. Id.
104 99 S. Ct. at 1961 (emphasis added).
105 99 S. Ct. at 2489. See note 36 supra.
106 See 99 S.Ct. at 1980. (Powell, J., dissenting): "Determining whether a private action would be consistent with the 'underlying purposes' of a legislative scheme permits a court to decide for itself what the
goals of a scheme should be, and how these goals should be advanced."
107 In determining whether implication of a private remedy would be consistent with or necessary to the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme, courts should examine such variables as the Act's legislative
history, the applicable statute's legislative history, the language of the other provisions of the same Act, the
legislative history of those provisions that provide for express remedies on the basis of similar conduct as the
statute in question, the availability and sufficiency of existing civil and criminal sanctions, including administrative sanctions, and the existence and adequacy of state remedies.
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enacting the statute in question. 0 8 In another light, Redington implicitly
recognizes that a similar relationship should be reinforced between the state
and federal governments. Fundamental notions of comity, federalism, and the
tenth amendment demand that the branches of the federal government not
usurp functions traditionally and fundamentally within the purview of the
States. 10 9 Such, of course, was the law long prior to Redington. The Redington
opinion, however, implicitly underscores that the federal courts should be particularly aware that implication of private rights of action may displace functions traditionally within the scope of the States.
In view of the modified Cort test, the question arises whether the test involves a balancing process or whether all factors must be met in order for a
private remedy to be implied. Prior Supreme Court cases evidence that a clear
expression of legislative history is almost always controlling." 0 Otherwise, as
Redington points out, the initial step of the altered Cort test must be satisfied as a
prerequisite to considering the other factors. Therefore, if the applicable
statute grants rights in certain persons or proscribes certain conduct as illegal,
then a court should inquire whether implication of a private right of action is
consistent with the underlying purposes of the statute and is not a remedy that
has been traditionally relegated to state law.' Upon examination, both of
these inquiries should be answered in the affirmative in order to imply a private
right of action. As Justice White noted, the third Cort factor is often vital for
construing the legislative history in such a manner so as to assure that the congressional intent underlying the statute is effectuated.1 2 And, as discussed
above, the fourth factor is essential to the federal judiciary's adherence to fundamental principles of comity, federalism, and the tenth amendment.1 3 Further, for the courts to apply a balancing process may induce them to engage in
a policy analysis that Redington sought to forbid. Accordingly, the better view is
to require that all the factors of the modified Cori test must be met.
In conclusion, an additional issue must be addressed. Concurring in Cannon, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stewart, warned Congress that, with
respect to the recognition of private rights of action, "the ball, so to speak, may
108 Some commentators have argued that the implication test, as applied in Piper and Santa Fe, has an additional requirement of necessity: whether implying a private remedy is necessary to effectuate the statute's
purpose. 1J. CORP. LAW, supra note 9, at 391; 73 Nw. U.L. REV., supra note 9, at 1141. See Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 477; Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 26, 41; notes 102-03 supra and
accompanying text. However, in Cannon, the Court stated that it "has long been recognized that under certain limited circumstances the failure of Congress to [provide an express remedy] is not inconsistent with an intent on its part to have such a remedy available to the persons benefited by its legislation." 99 S. Ct. at
1967-68 (emphasis added). In light of these decisions, regardless of whether the final determination to imply
a private right of action is based on necessity as opposed to consistency with the legislative scheme, such implication must be at least helpful to the effectuation of Congress' intent.
109 See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1976); Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S.
25-26 (1961) (per curiam); Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957); Barsky v. Board of Regents,
347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954). See also Burks v. Lasker, 99 S. Ct. 561 (1979). Federal intervention into areas
traditionally relegated to the states would impair "the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively
in a federal system." Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975). See notes 88-90 supra and accompanying text.
110 See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. at 1956; Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 82; notes 71, 85-87
supra and accompanying text.
111 See 99 S. Ct. at 2489; notes 71-74, 93 supra and accompanying text.
112 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 79-83 (WhiteJ., dissenting); notes 49-52, 101 supra
and accompanying text.
113 See notes 88-90, 109 supra and accompanying text.
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now be in its court.
From now on, he cautioned, without sufficient
specificity on Congress' part, the Court should be "extremely reluctant" to
imply private remedies.1 1 5 Justice Rehnquist, however, does not distinguish
whether the Court's potential reluctance to imply private rights of action
should extend to already enacted federal statutes as well as to those passed in
the future. Surely, in all practicality, he cannot expect Congress to engage in
the onerous task of reevaluating its previously enacted legislation to determine
whether private remedies should be provided. Further, Justice Rehnquist's
views, as shared and expanded by Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon,1 1 6 even
when applied solely to prospective legislation, are not an accurate reflection on
congressional policy-making." 7 When Congress legislates on a particular subject, it often has several difficult issues before it. One of these issues may well
be whether a private right of action should be provided to injured parties under
the prospective statute. Although Congress frequently elects to answer this
question, it may decline to do so for a number of reasons. These reasons may
include that Congress desired to leave the issue open for future judicial
development, that, from previously enacted statutes with similar import where
private remedies had been implied by the courts, Congress presumed that such
a remedy would be inferred in the statute in question, or that Congress simply
neglected the issue. In one sense, this abdication by Congress of its legislative
function is unfortunate. In practice, however, to expect legislators, whose incumbency often depends on avoiding the controversial issues and whose
distaste for addressing complicated legal matters is legendary, to address these
issues because the Court has advised them that "the ball is in their court" is
unrealistic. n 8 It may well be true that Congress, at times, declines to act in its
legislative capacity as the Founders envisioned. Such a result may be unfortunate but it is the nature of our political system. For the courts to become
oblivious to this fact of the legislative process, and refuse to imply private rights
of action on this basis, would cause needless injustices to injured parties who
would be left without adequate redress."t 9
114 99 S. Ct. at 1968 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
115 Id. See notes 40-46 supra and accompanying text.
116 99 S. Ct. at 1975 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell asserted that implication of a private cause
of action is constitutionally permissible only where there exists the most compelling evidence of affirmative
legislative intent. See notes 53-59 supra and accompanying text.
117 See notes 60-61 supra and accompanying text.
118 See Traynor, supra note 61, at 424. Addressing the criticism that judges do not have adequate factfinding information to make enlightened policy decisions, Dean Wellington, who often favors judicial
restraint, remarked:
While there can be no question that the fact-finding facilities available to legislatures through committee hearings and investigations are frequently helpful and are facilities that a court cannot command, this advantage is less than meets the eye. On many issues more than enough factual information is generated without hearings; legislative facts abound and for every expert there is his
equal and opposite number. Each has published widely; each researched extensively. Judges,
then, often have as many useful legislative facts as do legislators.
Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J.
221, 240 (1973).
119 See generally TRAYNOR, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND'TOMORROW 52 (M. Paulsen ed. 1959): "[T]he
real concern is not the remote possibility of too many creative decisions but their continuing scarcity. The
growth of the law, far from being unduly accelerated by judicial boldness, is unduly hampered by a judicial
lethargy that masks itself as judicial dignity ...." See O.W. HOLMES, supranote 92, at 35. See also Cannon
where it was noted that when ascertaining the congressional intent underlying the enactment of a particular
statute, the Court "must take into account its contemporary legal context." 99 S. Ct. at 1958. Thus, the
contemporary legal context was far different after Borak was decided in 1964 than when Cori was handed
down in 1972. As to the former, the legal climate indicated that the Court was receptive to the implication of
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VI. Conclusion
Judicial implication of private rights of action under federal law raises fundamental issues underlying the relationship between the federal judiciary and
Congress on one hand, and, to a lesser extent, between the federal government
and the States. To resolve these difficult questions of separation of powers and
federalism in a manner that comports with the Constitution and which at the
same time fulfills the congressional intent underlying the applicable statute, at
times, can be a burdensome process. To complicate matters, the needs of aggrieved persons who otherwise may have no legal recourse to redress their injuries, absent implication of a private remedy, remain a continual problem for
courts that are concerned with construing the applicable statute in an equitable
manner. Thus, the task confronting the federal courts in determining whether
to imply a private right of action under a particular statute is by no means an
easy one. While the courts should acknowledge that implication of federal
rights of action is subject to a somewhat stringent standard, they also should
recognize that such implication in appropriate circumstances is wholly consistent with the Constitution and with the effectuation of Congress' intent
underlying the applicable statute.

private remedies. After Cort, however, the Court, embarking on a different approach, has become more
reluctant, nevertheless, "has continued to give careful attention to claims that a private remedy should be
implied in statutes which omit any express remedy." Id. at 1958 n.24.

